By Commodore (Dr) Johnson Odakkal (Retd)
In the intricate web of South Asian geopolitics, Pakistan has long been regarded as an outsider in Bangladesh’s evolving strategic landscape, a relic of a shared but fractured past.
Post 1971, Bangla ties with Pakistan have remained cautious and fraught with historical grievances. While trade and diplomacy have continued at a superficial level, deeper engagement has been muted by history.
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History at Mongla in 53 years
Recent developments have reignited concerns about the footprint in Bangladesh. In December 2024, a Pakistan-flagged cargo vessel docked at Mongla Port, marking a significant milestone in Bangladesh-Pakistan relations. The vessel carried 25 metric tonnes of Basmati rice from Karachi’s Qasim Port, part of a government-to-government trade deal inked a few months prior.
While the volume of trade was nominal, its symbolism was immense, this was the first direct maritime trade engagement between the two countries since 1971. A historic first in 53 Years, this, at first glance, is projected to be a positive sign of thawing relations, a reflection of Bangladesh’s evolving economic pragmatism.
Mongla is not just another port; it is Bangladesh’s second-largest maritime hub, strategically located to provide access to India’s eastern borders, Bhutan, and Nepal. Any increase in foreign military or intelligence activity in this zone raises security concerns, especially for India, with Bangladesh’s proximity to connectivity projects and counter-insurgency efforts in the Northeast.
The real worry is that Mongla could become a conduit for intelligence infiltration, given Pakistan’s history of using trade routes and diplomatic missions as cover for espionage operations. If ISI-backed networks were to use Mongla as a staging point for intelligence collection, smuggling, or radicalisation efforts, it could pose a serious security risk to both Bangladesh and India.
China’s potential role in this equation cannot be ignored. Beijing has already invested heavily in Bangladesh’s port infrastructure, including Mongla, raising questions about whether Pakistan’s engagement is part of a larger China-backed strategic realignment in South Asia. If Pakistan is indeed leveraging China’s influence to gain a foothold in Bangladesh’s maritime security domain, this would significantly alter regional power dynamics.
Unpacking the Signals from Dhaka
The developments at Mongla raise important questions about Bangladesh’s broader geopolitical calculations. Was this a simple trade agreement, or does it signal a shift in Dhaka’s diplomatic positioning? While the interim government under Mohammed Yunus has emphasised economic pragmatism, there are underlying currents that suggest this engagement with Pakistan could be more than just commerce. Pakistan’s diplomatic engagements in Dhaka have intensified in recent months, with its diplomats meeting key figures in political and judicial circles.
Beyond trade, there are concerns that Mongla’s opening to Pakistani shipments might pave the way for deeper intelligence operations. Historically, Pakistan has used trade and economic ties as a cover for strategic penetration into host nations. The increased maritime activity, coupled with Pakistan’s deep-rooted networks in Bangladeshi Islamist organisations, raises suspicions about whether Mongla could evolve into something more than just a trading outpost.
The Chicken’s Neck in Focus
The Siliguri Corridor, or the Chicken’s Neck, is a narrow strip of land (22 km wide) that connects India’s northeastern states to the rest of the country. This region has long been a focal point of India’s national security, as any external interference in this corridor could severely disrupt connectivity and escalate vulnerabilities in the Northeast. Recent intelligence reports indicate increased Pakistani activity near this corridor, prompting high-level discussions within India’s security establishment. Indian Army Chief General Upendra Dwivedi has publicly warned about the presence of Pakistani intelligence elements near the corridor.
Pakistan’s ISI has a long history of supporting insurgencies in India’s Northeast, leveraging Bangladesh and Nepal as transit points for arms smuggling, training, and operational logistics. From the days of the ULFA insurgency to more recent attempts at reviving dormant militant networks, ISI has consistently exploited border regions adjacent to Bangladesh to funnel resources into separatist movements.
Recent reports suggest that Pakistan has renewed contacts with radical elements within Bangladesh, including Jamaat-e-Islami factions, as part of a broader intelligence push. A deeper assessment is needed to determine whether this is a short-term maneuver or a more extensive ISI strategy to counterbalance India’s influence in Bangladesh and the Northeast.
Diplomatic Tightrope or Calculated Gamble?
Bangladesh finds itself at an interesting geopolitical juncture. With the interim government in Dhaka facing growing regional pressures, there is an emerging trend of pragmatic diplomacy, engaging multiple stakeholders—India, China, and now Pakistan. The question remains: is this a carefully managed balancing act, or is Dhaka opening up to new risks?
While Bangladesh had traditionally leaned toward India for security cooperation, the opening of Mongla to Pakistani shipments and the increasing reports of ISI activity along its border regions suggest a widening diplomatic aperture. The government has not officially acknowledged or denied Indian concerns, leaving room for speculation on how deep this engagement might go.
Indian Strategic Response
For India, the Mongla development and Pakistan’s activities near Siliguri cannot be dismissed as routine diplomatic moves. New Delhi would have ramped up surveillance on Mongla Port, employing satellite reconnaissance and naval intelligence gathering to monitor possible Pakistani intelligence penetration. Meanwhile, diplomatic back channels have been activated to seek clarification from Dhaka on the nature of its engagements with Islamabad.
India recognises that an overtly aggressive reaction could backfire, pushing Bangladesh further into a multi-aligned foreign policy model that includes greater engagement with China and Pakistan. Instead, India appears to be adopting a watchful waiting strategy, assessing whether these developments represent a genuine shift in Bangladesh’s foreign policy or merely short-term tactical maneuvering.
Still Tactical and Not Yet a Strategic Shift
Pakistan’s renewed presence in Mongla and near Siliguri must be seen as strategic opportunism rather than an outright policy shift in Bangladesh-Pakistan relations. While Dhaka may be entertaining these engagements for short-term diplomatic flexibility, it is unlikely to jeopardise its long-standing security ties with India.
The coming months will reveal whether this is a passing diplomatic engagement or a more profound geopolitical shift, one with serious implications for South Asia’s evolving security landscape.
Note: The writer is an Indian Navy Veteran and Adjunct Research Faculty (Strategic & Security Studies) at Naval War College, Goa
