New Delhi: At least eight security personnel and a civilian driver were killed on Monday in the deadliest strike in two years by Maoists in two years on security forces in Chhattisgarh. The ambush, triggered by a 60-70kg improvised explosive device (IED) has once again raised concerns about lapses in standard operating procedures (SOPs) and the persistent threat posed by Left-Wing Extremism (LWE).
The attack serves as another grim reminder of the Maoist menace in the country, despite the massive counter-insurgency efforts and the Union government’s pledge to make the country free from the LWE.
Past ambushes on security personnel
The victims, four personnel each from the District Reserve Guard (DRG) and Bastar Fighters, were returning from a gruelling three-day anti-Maoist operation. Their vehicle was the seventh in a convoy of eight. Despite the road being cleared earlier by a Road Opening Party (ROP), the powerful IED detonated around 2.15pm, leaving a massive 10-foot deep crater and scattering debris across the area.
The attack in Bijapur mirrors past Maoist ambushes in the state. An ambush in April 2023 in Dantewada killed 10 jawans whereas in Tekulguda attack in 2011, 25 security personnel lost their lives. The incidents show a recurring vulnerability especially during the return journeys, often marked by fatigue and reduced vigilance. Brigadier Basant Kumar Ponwar (retd), an expert in jungle warfare, while talking to the Times of India emphasised the need for strict adherence to SOPs.
There were multiple lapses
“After victory, lethargy takes over. They can’t let down their guard after initial victory in a war zone, or they become the easiest of targets. The most important aspect is to ensure SOPs are followed. To ensure that the ROP has cleared 50-150 yards on both sides of the road in a ‘V’ formation. Did sniffer dogs track the route? A secure corridor has to be given to vehicles and a mobile patrol is supposed to be there on the axis to monitor movement,” Ponwar was quoted by TOI as saying.
According to preliminary investigations, there were multiple lapses. The first being the use of a light motor vehicle for transporting security personnel in a high-risk area. Police suspect the IED went undetected due to insufficient de-mining and route sanitisation. The blast was likely manually triggered by a Maoist operative hiding nearby, maybe mirroring as a villager. This despite another IED weighing 20-22kg being successfully defused by CRPF personnel earlier the same day.
Eyewitnesses described the blast as deafening, with parts of the destroyed vehicle and uniforms of the jawans found hanging from nearby trees. The bodies were recovered and taken to Dantewada.
